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NEW ORLEANS v. GREAT SOUTHERN T. & T. CO.
RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.
CITY OF NEW ORLE.NS v.THE GREAT SOUTHERN TELEPRONE AND TELEGRAPH CO.
An annual charge of five dollars per pole, upon the poles of a telephone
company already established, imposed by a municipal ordinance as a "consideration for the privilege," is not a tax, either on property or as a license, and
cannot be sustained as an exercise of the taxing power.
Such annual charge is not an exercise of the police power, as it involves no
consideration of public order, health, morals, or convenience.
A municipal ordinance, granting to a particular company authority to construct and maintain telephone lines on the streets, without any limitation as
to time, and for a consideration stipulated, when accepted and acted on by
the grantee complying with all the conditions of the ordinance and constructing a valuable and expensive plant, acquires thereby the features of a contract, which the city cannot thereafter abolish or alter in its essential terms,
without the consent of the grantee. The imposition of new and burdensome
conditions is a violation thereof.
A proviso in such ordinance, that "the actsand doings of the company under
this ordinance shall be subject to any ordinance or ordinances hereafter passed
by the city," does not convert the grant into a mere revocable permit. It
assumes that the ordinance is to continue in full force and effect, and recognizes the right of the grantee to do and to act under and in accordance with it,
and only subjects "such acts and doings" to future municipal regulations, not
inconsistent with the ordinance itself.

from the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans.
Suit by the City of New Orleans, plaintiff and appellant,
against The Great Southern Telephone and Telegraph Company,
defendant and appellee, to compel payment of a tax of five dollars per pole, put up by the company.
APPEAL

Walter ff. Rogers, City Attorney, and Branch K. Miller,
Ass't City Attorney, for appellant.
Bayne, Denegre & Bayne, for appellee.
FExNER, J. (February 13, 1888).-The defendant is the
assignee and successor of The New Orleans Telephonic Exchange, referred to in the following ordinance of the City of
New Orleans, adopted February 18, 1879 :
"An Ordinance authorizing the construction and maintenance
of a telephonic telegraph line through the streets of the City of
New Orleans.
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,Si-crioxT 1.-Be it ordained by the City Council of the
City of Ncw Orleans, that the New Orleans Telephonic Exchange is hereby authorized to construct and maintain a line or
lines of telegraphs through the streets of this city; the lines or
line to be constructed along such streets, at such points, and in
such manner, as to the kind and position of telegraph poles, the
height of the wires above the streets, and in all other particulars, as the administrator of the department of improvements
may direct: provided, however, that the said company shall
connect their wires with the mayor's office, chief of police's
office, and fire-alarm telegraph office, and place and keep telephones therein, free of charge to the city, so that said telephones
may he used in connection with all wires under the control of
said company.
"SEC. 2. And be itfurther ordained," etc., "1that all the acts
and doings of said company under this ordinance shall be subject to any ordinance or ordinances that may hereafter be passed
by the city council concerning same."
Under this ordinance defendant constructed, and has since
maintained, telephonic lines through the streets, built according
to the directions of the administrator of improvements, and
with his approval, and has furnished the city with the free
telephonic service stipulated, and has complied in all respects
with the terms of the ordinance. The plant established by defendant is expensive and valuable. The defendant pays a tax
upon this plant as property, and also pays a license tax levied
on its business. In April, i880, the general assembly of the
State passed act, No. 124, authorizing corporations formed for
the purpose of transmitting intelligence by magnetic telegraph
or telephone, to "construct and maintain telegraph, telephone,
and other lines along all State, parish, or public roads or public
works, and along and parallel to any of the railroads in the
State, and over the waters of the State, provided that the ordinary use of such roads, works, railroads, and waters be not
thereby obstructed, and alonq the streets of any cit1'2 with the consent of the council or trustees thereqf."
Me defendant having
the prior consent of the city, certainly came under the protection of this act as to the maintenance of its lines, from the date of
its passage. In December, 1883, the city council passed "An
VOL. XXXVI.-55
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Ordinance to regulate and control the erection and maintenance
of poles for supporting wires of the telephones within and on
the streets, ways, and public places of the City of New Orleans," containing various provisions on the general subject,
with none of which we have any present concern, except the
following : that "no poles shall be allowed to be erected, or any
e-xisting poles be allowed to remain, in that portion of the city
embraced by Jackson street, Elysian Fields, Roman street, and
the Mississippi river, ereept on the payment of fire dollars per
annum, per pole, for every sach pole erected or at present in 'use,
within that section of the city; * * * * * said payments

to be in considerationof the privilege and advantage of entering
upon, using and permanently occupying the streets, ways and
places of the city for private properly, and to be paid annually
in advance, commencing January 1, 1884." Defendant had six
hundred poles within the section designated, on which the sum
of $3,000 is claimed to be due, and the object of the present
action is to enjoin defendant from using or maintaining said
poles for telephonic purposes, until payment thereof be made.
It is not pretended that the exaction claimed is a tax, either on
property or as a license, or that it is an exercise of the taxing
powers, in any respect. The ordinance qualifies it as a price or
consideration for the privileges enjoyed. It is not even alleged
that defendant has ever consented or contracted to pay such consideration, and the attempt made to prove such consent was not
only ultra petitionem, but the evidence offered for the purpose
was manifestly insufficient and illegal, and was properly rejected.
There is, therefore, entire absence of any legal tie binding the
defendant as a debtor for the amount claimed, and, if the city
were suing simply for a money judgment, the petition would set
forth no cause of action. The real relief claimed by the city,
however, is found in the injunction prayed fir, based on the
theory that the provision of the ordinance referred to, is a regulation or condition, imposed upon the maintenance of the poles
and exercise of the privileges which the city had the right to
impose, and without compliance with which the defendant could
not lawfully continue to maintain and exercise them.
The question for our determination is whether the city had
the right to make such a regulation or impose such condition.

NEW ORLEANS v. GREAT SOUTIERN T. & T. CO.

425

It is not seriously contended that the provision is a police regulation ; and, indeed, such contention is silenced, not only by the
nature, but by the express terms of the provision itself, which
qualify the exaction as a "consideration for the privilege."
NO consideration whatever of public morals, health, or convenience is involved. It is not proposed to abolish the use of poles
or to alter their location, construction, or use, in any way, to
subserve the public comfort. The simple requirement is the
plyment of a price, on payment of which the status quo contilues; while without such payment, it must cease. The case
pre.;ents no feature of an exercise of the police power.
The only remaining question is whether, after granting the
defendant authority to construct and to maintain its lines, without limitation as to time, and withi no other consideration than
the furnishing of certain free telephonic fhcilities to the city,
after the defendant lizis, at great expense, established its plant
and constructed its lines, and when it has fully complied
with all the conditions imposed, the city can now exact this
large additional consideration for the continued enjoyment of
privileges already granted. If the city can do this now, she
could have done it the very day after the defendant had coinpleted its lines, when it had incurred all the expense, and before
it had reaped a particle of return. If she can impose a charge
of five dollars p,r pole, she can, with equal powe -,impose one
of one thousand dollars, and, for that matter, she could arbitrarily revoke the grant at her pleasure. Either she is bound,
according to the terms of her proposition accepted and acted on
by the defendant, or she is not bound at all. Obviously, upon
the clearest considerations of law and justice, the grant of
authority to defendant, when accepted and acted upon, became
an irrevocable contract, and the city is powerless to set it aside
or to interpolate new or more onerous considerations therein.
Such has been the well-recognized doctrine of the authorities
since the Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. 518.
The main contention of the city, however, is that the second
section of the ordinance robs it of the features of a contract, and
converts the authority granted into a mere revocable permit.
The section is as follows: "That all the acts and doings
of said company under this ordinance, shall be subject to
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any ordinance or ordinances that may iereafter be passed by
the city council concerning the same." The city's construction of this section is strained and unreasonable, and conforms neither to its spirit or letter. It is not conceivable
that the grantee would have invested its means in such an
enterprise, had it imagined that the term and conditions of
its enjoyment of the privilege lay at the entire mercy of the city.
If any such unreasonable intention lurked in the minds of the
council which passed the ordinance, the grantor under familiar
rules of construction, came under the obligation of expressing it

clearly and unambiguously. But what is it that is subject to
regulation and control by future ordinances? It is "the acts
and doings of said company under this ordinance." This assumes
that the ordinance itself is to continue in full force and effect,
and certainly reserves no power to repeal, destroy, or alter it in
any of its essential features and considerations. It recognizes
the right of the company to act and to do under and according
to the ordinance, only subjecting such "acts and doings" to
municipal regulations, not conflicting with the ordinance itself.
We consider that the imposition of the additional and burdensome consideration here involved, is not within the scope of the
right reserved.
Judgment affirmed.
License of Telegraph Companies.In the recent case of West. Un. Td.
Co. v. Philadelphia and Mut. Un. Td.
Co. v. Same, S. Ct. Penna., January
23, 1888, the facts were similar to
those in the principal case, but the
court ruled differently as to the law.
The city of Philadelphia had passed
ordinances providing that "no pole
shall be duly erected without the
license of the superintendent of the
police and fire alarm telegraph shall
have been previously obtained therefor, as provided in this section; and
for every license so granted there
shall be paid to the city treasurer,
for the use of the city, the sum of
five dollars per pole-" that "it shall
be the duty of the owners of tele-

graph poles, whether corporations or
individuals, to make application to
the said superintendent for a license
to maintain poles for the ensuing
year, said application to be made on
the first M[onday of January in every
year, and that the charge for issuing
such a license shall be one dollar for
each and every pole authorized to be
maintained, which shall be paid to
the city treasurer, for the use of the
city ;" that "on all conductors or
wire suspended above ground, except
such as are used or owned by the city
of Philadelphia, an annual payment
of $2.50 per mile, or part thereof, in
length, of wires or conductors, shall
be paid for each and every wire or
conductor used, or to be used, for tele-
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graphic, telephone, or other purposes;" and that "failure to make
payment as required thereby shall
subject theoflbnder to the penalty of
fifty dollars per day for each and
every day thereafter until payment
is made." The actions were brought
by the city, for the amount of the
license fees due under these ordinances. They were heard before a referee, who reportcd: First, that the
charge sought to be recovered by the
city could not be maintained as a tax,
because it is not within the power of
taxation which has been delegated to
the city by the State; and, secodd,
that the charges are unreasonable as
license fees, and operate in substance
as a tax, and that the ordinances
were therefore void. Then thecases
were sent again to the referee, to report on the following questions:
Vhether the city had authority to
allow or prohibit telegraph poles or
wires, through the streets of thecity,
which was answered negatively;
whether it could exact a fee or payment as a condition for their erection
or continuance; and whether the ordinances in controversy, were a valid
exercise of authority; these two
questions were answered, that the
payment sought to be exacted was
unreascnable.
But the court held
otherwise, after a lengthy review of
the multiplicity of uses, claiming
either the soil or the air of the city
highways.
"It is an established principle that
remuneration should be in proportion, not only to time and outlay, but
to responsibility, and a public or private agent who is exposed to loss may
demand higher pay. That such is
the relation of the city to the various
companies which have been empowered to occupy its streets with a view
to gain, is to me abundantly clear,
and they should not grudge a reason-

427

able compensation for the space they
occupy, and the risk which she incurs on their account. That the rate
cannot readily be determined is no
doubt true, but this circumstance affirds an argument for the city, because there is a presumtption in favor
of the acts of public bodies within
the scope of ti.eir powers. The question is not, would we name $5 a
reasonable fee? but, is it so plainly
in excess as to render it ourduty to
reverse the decision of councils ? On
this point, as I have already intimated, we are of opinion with the
city, and tl.erefore sustain the exceptions which she has filed, and send
the case back to the referee for reconsideration on the above point."
On error, this decision was affirmed,
the Supreme Court holding that the
companies were properly subjected
to a reasonable license fee; that it
was not an open question, and concurring with the conclusion of the
court below, that the fee charged was
not so obviously excessive aiid unjust
as to authorize arevision of the action
of the City Councils.
This decision appears more con-'
sonant with reason and justice than
that in the principal case. And
there is, besides, a considerable weight
of authority supporting the opinion
of the rennsylvania court. See ai to
the power of municipalities to charge
license fees to railway, telegraph, and
other public institutions: State v.
11erod, 29 Iowa, 123; Thorpe v. .utland &.B..R.Co., 27Vt. 149; Fran~ford,
etc., 1B. Co. v. Philadelphia,53 1'enna.
St. 119; Johnson v. Philadelphia, 60
Id. 445; 3ayor of iXew York v.
Second Ave. B. Co., 32 N. Y. 261;
Allerton v. City of Chicago, 20 Am. L.
Reg. (N. S ) 473; and concerning the
amount of the license fees, examine
Chilrcrsv..People,11 Mich. 43; £late
v. Cassaday, 22 Minn. 312; TEnney v.
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Lenz, 16 Wis. 566; Carterv. Dow, 16
Id. 299; Johnson v. Philaddphia,60
Penna. St. 445, 450; Cincinnati v.
Bryson, 15 Ohio, 625 ($3 dray license);
Cincinnati v. Buckingham, 10 Id. 257
(25 cents market fee); Kip v. Paterson, 26 N. J. L. 298; Ash v. People,
11 Mich. 347 ($5 market license);
Boston v. Schaeffer, 9 Pick. 415 ($1,000
theatrical license); Ritson v. Ann Arbor, 26 Mich. 325; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio St. 534 ($63.50 theatrical license); Van Baalen v. People,
40 Mich. 258 ($200 pawnbrokers'
license); Chicaqo Packing Co. v. Chicago, 88 111. 221 ($100 packing house
license); St. Paiulv. Colter, 12 Minn.
41; JA-layor v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137 ($20
baker license); Mays v. Cincinnati, 1
Ohio St. 263 ($95 for huckster license
and $5 for issuance).
Gonditions and regulations as to erection of poles.-lt is undoubtedly competent for a municipality to couple
with permission to use its streets for
telegraph purposes, such reasonable
conditions as the occupancy of a publie street by posts and wires would
suggest, and without such conditions,
the erection and maintenance of appliances of the business of the company would be subject to the reasonable control of the municipal by-laws:
Dill. Mun. Corp.,
555, 558, 575.
The same remark is true as to regulation by the legislature. A bond may
be required of the company to fill up
and repave excavations in the streets,
and to indemnify the municipality for
losses caused by its negligence. Compensation in the shape of license fees
or otherwise may be exacted. The
size, n imber, shape, material, location, and painting of poles, may be
regulated.
The right to erect telegraph poles
in the streets of a city dues not carry
with it the right to erect broken and
unsightly poles: Forsythe v. B. & 0.

Tel. C., 12 Mo. App.494. The municipality may regulate the route and
elevation of the wires: Ain. Un.
Tel. Co. v. Hlarrison, 31 N. J. Eq.
627. See also Philadelphiav. IF. U.
Tel. Co., 11 Phila. 327. Until regulations are adopted, the municipal authorities are not at liberty to treat
poles in the streets as a nuisance, subject to abatement by destruction by
the municipal authorities: Am. Un.
Tel. Co. v. Harrison,31 N. J. Eq. 627.
As to whether telegraph poles and
wires are nuisances, see also 2 Dill.
Mun. Corp., 698; Lac'land v. B.R.
Co., 31 Mo. ISO; Porterv. B. B. Co.,
33 Id. 128; Atlantic, etc., R. 1?. Co. v.
St Louis, 66 Id. 228; Bandle T. B. B.
Co., 65 Id. 325.
It would seem, however, from
Wandsworth Board of Works v. United
Td. Co., L. R. 13 Q. B. Div. 904, that
a telephone or telegraph company
could string its wires so high across
a street as to be beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal authorities,
such jurisdiction being confined to
the surface of the street and such distance above and below it as is ordinarily used for public traffic. This
case follows Corerdale v. Charlton, 4
Q. B. Div. 104, but it is governed by
a statute and would probably be of no
great weight as an authority in American courts.
In England, by statute, power is
conferred upon the railway commissioners to decide upon the position
and composition of telegraph wires
and poles, in case the municipality
and the telegraph authorities cannot
agree. In lVandsworth Local Board
v. Postmaster Gen'l,4 Ry. & Can. Traffic Cases, 301 (Browne & Mac), the
Local Board wanted underground
wires. The railway commissioners
decided that overhead wires should be
allowed subject to the following conditions: 1. That all wires should be
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of copper. 2. That all poles should
be of iron. 3. That no wire should
be placed over, along, or across any
road or footway at a less height than
thirty feet above such road or footway. 4. That where a wire crosses
over any public road or Ltreet, the
distance between the points of support at either side of the road or
street should n6 in any case exceed
100 yards.
Liabiliy for injuring tdeyraph lines,
cables, poles, or instrumeas.-Theuninterrupted and unimpeded use of lines
and instruments of communication is
so important to the public that, besidesthe ordinary liability of all persons toanswer a civil action for damages for a completed injury toany telegraphic apparatus orto be restrained
by ihitnction from doing an apprehended injury to such apparatus, there
are criminal enactments upon the
subject. Thus, in England, lhy statute, 24 & 25 Virt. c. 97, 37, it is provided that whosoevershall unlawfully
and maliciously cut, break, throw
down, destroy, injure, or remove amy
battery, machinery, wire, cable, post,
or other mtter or thing whatsoever
being palrt of or being used or cmployed in or about any electric or
magnetic telegraph, or in the working
thereof, or shall unlawfully and maliciously prevent or obstruct in any
manner whatsoever, the sending, conveyance, or delivery of any comunnication by any such telegraph.shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and being
convicted thereof shall be lia:ble, at
the discretion of the court, to be imprisonled forany term not exceeding
two years, with or without hard labor; pr rided,that if it shall appear
toanvjuitice, on the examination of
any person chrged with any offense
again-t this section thlat it is not expedient to the einds of justice tlmat the
same should be prosecuted by indict-
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ment, the justice may proceed summarily to hear and determine the
same, and the offender slall, o01 con-

viction thereof, at the discretion of
the justice, either be committed to the
common jail or house of correction, there to be imprisoned only, or
to be imprisoned and kept to hard labor for any term not exceeding three
months, or else shall forfeit and pay
such sun of money not excced:ng £10,
as to the justice shall seem meet.
By section 38, whosoever siall unlawfully and maliciously by any
overt act, attempt to commit any
of the offLnses in the last preceding
section mentioned, shall, on eonlviction thereof, before a justice of the
peace, at the discretion of the justice, either be committed to the coinmon jail, or house of correction, there
to be imprisoned or to be iniprisoned
and kept to hard labor, for any term
not exceeding three months, or else
shall forfeit and pay such sum of
money, not exceeding £10, as to tie
justice sliall seem meet.
Two civil cases wherein damages
were sought for injuryto telegraph lines
have come to the wr ter'b notice. Both
were injuries to submarine cables. In
one, the plaintiffs were the owners of
a cable lying at tie bottom of tle sea
between England and France. The
defendants were aliens and tleir silips,
while sailing upon the high seas more
than three miles from the English
coast, lowered an anchor and injured
the cable. Field, thattie court would
presume that the miastcrs of the ships
were aware of tie existence and situation of submarine cabies, and that a
dmtty was thereupon cast on all such
masters ofships to manage their ves-

sels so earefilly and skillfully as to
avoid (if possible, in the exercise of
reasonable precaution) injuring these
cables: Submarine Tl.graph Co. v
Dickson, 15 C. B. N. S. 759; 10 Jur.
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N.,S. 211; 33L. J.C. P. 139; 12W.
R.3S4; 10 L. T. N.S. 32.
The other case was that of the
"Clara Killam," which let go an anchor to keep from going ashore. The
anchor caught in a cable and it was
cut in order to get clear. Subsequently the vessel was sued for the
damage done. The court thoughtthe
case so novel that it needed time to
consider, and went off to talk to "the
elder brethren of the Trinity Iouse"
about it. They advised that by ordinary i.autical skill, the damage to the
wire might have been avoided, and
that if a slip rope had been past.ed tinder the telegraph cable and hove taut,
the anchor might have been easily
cleared, the slip rope then let go, and
the cable dropped in its place. Held,
that the "Clara Killam" was "to
blame for the injury done to the wire,
and she was condemned in damages
and costs." The Clara Killam, 39 L.
J. Adm. 50.
Criminal prosecution of telegraph
companiesfor obstructingstreets.--Telegraph companies themselves may be
prosecuted criminally for obstructing
the highway. This was decided in
Beg v. United Kingdom Tel. Cb., 31 L.
J. M. C. 166; 2 B. & S. 647 n.; 9 Cox
Cr. Cas. 174. Where an ordinary
highway runs between fences, one on
each side, the right of passage of the

public covers the entire space between
the fences. An unauthorized obstruction upon it is an indictable nuisance
at common law. In the case last
cited, it was held that the company
were liable to conviction, even though
its posts were placed upon the hard
or metalled part of the highway, or
on an artificial footpath upon it, or
even though enough space for the
public traffic was left. The case is in
line with the many authorities, sanctioning the indictment of corporations
for obstructing highways: See Cin.
South. B. B. v. Commonwealth, 80 Ky.
137; 7 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 91;
L. & N. B. B. Co. v. State, 3 Head
(Tenn.) 524; Pittsburgh 1. & 0. B.
Co. v. Commonwcalth, 10 Am. & Eng.
R. R. Cas. 321; and see generally,
"Indictment
of Corporations," 6
Crim. Law Mag. 317.
A telephone company is not entitled
to a preliminary injunction to restrain the authorities of a town from
removing poles for telephone wires,
when the claim on which the right is
founded is, as a matter of law, unsettled: New York, etc., Tel. Co. v. East
Orange, 42 N. J. Eq. 490. See, also,
Citizens' Coach Co. v. Camden 11. B. Co.,
29 Id. 299; Atty. Gen'l v. United
Kingdom, de., Tcl. Co., 30 Reav. 287.
ADELBERT HIAMILTON.

Chicago.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
VANVACTOR r. STATE.
A school teacher may inflict reasonable punishment upon a pupil for insubordination. Where such punishment is administered with a two-pronged
switch, in nine sharp blows, which does not cause the pupil to make an outcry, and which produces no serious injury, although the punishment was
painful and caused some abrasion of the skin, and where it is not shown that
it was ma!iciousiy inflicted, the teacher is not guilty of an assault and battery.

APPEAL

from Circuit Court of Marshall county.

VANVACITOR v. STATE.

A.

. Capron, for appellant.

C. P. Drummond and The Attorney- General, for appellee.
NIBLACK, J.-During the month of February, 1887, and for
some time afterwards, the appellant, Tyner Vanvactor, was a
teacher in, and as such had charge of, one of the public schools
of Marshall county. He was at that time only 18 years of age.
Edward Patrick, a boy then nearly 16 years old, was one of his
pupils. On a Friday afternoon during that month, while the
school was in session, Vanvactor directed Patrick to bring in
some wood, and put it in the stove which warmed the schoolroom. Patrick did as directed, but while engaged about the
stove, and while Vanvactor's face was turned in another direction, he made some antic demonstrations which created a general
laugh among the other attending children, and made a break in
the school exercises. Vanvactor, as a punishment for this
breach of good order, required Patrick to stand up by the stove
for a considerable time. After school closed, Patrick put on his
overcoat to start home, and, assumingto claim that by having to
stand by the stove he had become very warm, and liable to take
cold, he put Vanvactor's overcoat on over his own, and started
towards his home, in a direction different from that in which
Vanvactor had to go. Patrick had gotten several rods away
before Vanvactor became aware of what had occurred. He
thereupon called Patrick, and sending a boy after him, very peremptorily demanded a return of his overcoat, but Patrick refused compliance, and proceeded on his way home with the overcoat. This required Vanvactor to go home, a distance about a
mile, without an overcoat, when the weather was chilly and cold.
On the following Monday, when Patrick returned to school,
Vanvactor informed him that he stood temporarily suspended,
and told him that lie (Vanvactor) would see the township
trustee and the school director as to the course which ought to
be further pursued. During the day Vanvactor saw the township trustee, who advised him that Patrick should be required
either to take a whipping or leave the school, and in this view
Vanvactor concurred. On the evening of the same day, Vanvactor told Patrick what had been resolved upon in regard to
his punishment. Patrick very promptly replied that he would
VOL. XXXVI.-56
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not take a whipping. Patrick, nevertheless, returned to school
next morning, and told Vanvactor that lie had consulted the
family with whom lie lived, and that they had advised him to
take a whipping, and not leave the school, and that he was willing to take a whipping, provided that it should not be inflicted
upon him until after the school should be closed in the afternoon, and the other pnpils had left the school-house. To this
proposition Vanvactor assented. Accordingly, during the day,
Vanvactor provided a green switch for the occas-ion, which was
about three feet long, and forked near the middle, forming two
limber pIrongs composed of twigs. After the school had closed
that afternoon, and all others had left, and a few minutes of
apparent suspense had intervened, Patrick remarked that it was
time for the performance to begin, and assisted in removing a
table and in clearing the floor. He then placed himself before,
and with his face towards, the blackboard, and indicated that he
was ready to proceed. Vauvactor thereupon struck Patrick
nine sharp blows on the back part of his legs, between his body
and the knee joints. Patrick, at the time, made no outcry or
complaint, and the switch was not broken. Two or three days
later Yanvactor was arrested on the charge of having committed
an assault and battery upon Patrick, in whipping him as stated,
and taken before a justice of the peace, where lie was tried and
convicted. Upon an appeal to the circuit court, a jury found
him guilty of an assault and battery as charged, and fixed his
fine at one cent, upon which judgment was awarded. A question was reserved below, and is pressed very earnestly here, upon
the alleged insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict.
Patrick testified that Yanvactor laid on the blows hard, as if lie
was angry, and that after he went home and examined his legs,
he found them beat to a jelly. Upon further examination, however, it was made apparent that he meant only that Vanvactor
had inflicted hard blows, and had thereby imprinted marks and
abrasions upon his legs, which for a time gave him pain and
annoyance. Two or three other persons testified to having seen
marks and abrasions upon Patrick's legs, but as to the nature
and extent of these marks and abrasions their testimony was
variant and indefinite. It was shown, without controversy, that
on the day after the whipping Patrick came back to school with
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his skates, and neither made complaint nor manifested any impediment. Vanvactor testified that he did not hit Patrick what
could rightly be called "hard blows," but that he intended that
the blows he gave should inflict pain; that he was not in the
least angry, but was sorry to have to punish Patrick, and did so
punish him only under a sense of his duty as a teacher; that
Patrick was not an obedient pupil, but had made no serious
trouble until the Friday in February herein above referred to.
There are perhaps some isolated points in the evidence which
present some difficulty, but when these are considered in connection with all the other facts and circumstances concerning which
there was no controversy at the trial, we are of the opinion that
the evidence, as a whole, did not sustain the verdict. The books
commonly assume that a teacher has the same right to chastise
his pupil that a parent has to thus punish his child. But that
is only true in a limited sense. The teacher has no general right
of chastisement for all offenses as has the parent. The teacher's
right in that respect is restricted to the limits of his jurisdiction
and responsibility as a teacher. But within those limits a teacher
may exact a compliance with all reasonable commands, and may,
in a kind and reasonable spirit, inflict corporal punishment upon
a pupil for disobedience. This punishment should not be either
cruel orexcessive, and oughtalways tobe aplortioned to thegravity
of the offense, and within the bounds of moderation. But plainly,
when complaint is made, the calm and honest judgment of the
teacher as to what the situation required should have weight as
in the case of a parent under similar circumstances. And where
no improper weapon has been employed, the presumption will
be, until the contrary is made to appear, that what was done was
rightly done. Subject to these general rules, the teacher's right
to inflict, and the duty of inflicting corporal punishment upon a
pupil, and the reasonableness of such a punishment when imposed, must be judged of by the varying circumstances of each
particular case. 1 Bish. Crim. Law, § 886, and authorities
cited;-Danenhoffer v. State, 69 Ind. 295. To support a charge
of an assault and battery it is necessary to show that the act
complained of was intentionally committed. But in the case of
the chastisement of a pupil, the intent may be inferred from the
unreasonableness of the method adopted or the excess of force
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employed, but the burden of proving such unreasonableness or
such excess rests upon the State. In such a case, in addition to
the general presumption of his innocence, the teacher has the
presumption of having done his duty, in support of his defense :
Com. v. Randall, 4 Gray, 36; Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114;
State v. Alford, 68 N. 0. 322; Com. v. Seed, 5 Pa. Law J. Rep. 78.
In this case, Vanvactor had not only both of these presumptions in his favor, but all the circumstances tended to prove that
he acted with much caution, forbearance, and deliberation, in
the character as well as the extent of the punishment which he
visited upon Patrick. The switch used was not an inappropriate weapon for a boy of Patrick's age and apparent vigor.
Patrick's offense as a breach of good deportment in a school was
not one to be overlooked or treated lightly. It was calculated,
and was most likely intended, to humiliate Vanvactor in the
presence of his pupils, and its tendency was to impair his influence in the government of his school. The motive was
apparently revenge for having been required to stand by the
stove for a time, as a punishment for a previous violation of
good order. When the alternative of leaving the school or
taking a whipping was presented to him, Patrick did not object
to it, either as unreasonable or unjust. After consultation and
mature deliberation, he decided to accept a whipping, on condition that it be administered privately. In a spirit of evident
forbearance, the request thus implied was acceded to. With all
these preparations in view, Patrick had no reason to expect that
the chastisement would be a merely formal and painless ceremony. The legitimate object of chastisement is to inflict punishment by the pain which it causes as well as the degradation
which it implies. It does not, therefore, necessarily follow,
that because pain was produced, or that some abrasion of the
skin resulted from a switch, a chastisement was either cruel or
excessive. When a proper weapon has been used, the character
of the chastisement, with reference to any alleged cruelty or excess, must be determined by the nature of the offense, the age,
the physical and mental condition, as well as the personal attributes, of the pupil, and the deportment of the teacher, keeping
in view the presumptions to which we have alluded. All the
circumstances lead us to the conclusion that if Vanvactor really
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gave harder blows than ought to have been given, the error was
one ofjudgment only, and hence not one of improper or unlawful motive. The statement of Patrick that Vanvactor laid on
the blows hard, as if he wcs angry, was, when explained and
taken in connection with other evidence as stated, too trivial to
materially conflict with the conclusion thus reached. It must
be borne in mind that Patrick was not peremptorily required to
submit to corporal punishment, but that he accepted that kind
of punishment, with all its unpleasant consequences, in preference to a milder and latterly a much more usual and more
approved method of enforcing discipline in the schools when
grave offenses are committed, and that hemade no complaint or
protest at the time the blows, since complained of, were given:
Fertlich v. Hiiclh ner, 111 Ind. 472.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a
new trial.
Under proper circumstances a
teacher is authorized to inflict a reasonable corporal punishment upon the
pupil. This doctrine is fully sustained
by the authorities: 3 Green. Ev.,
63; State v. Mhner, 45 Ia. 248; s.
c. 24 Am. Rep. 769; 2 Kent. Com.
169, 170; Commonwealth v. Randall, 4
Gray (Mass.) 36 ; Landerv. Seaver,32
Vt. 114; Baldwin v. State, Ct. App.
Tex., "March 9, 1887 ; Stanfield v.
State, 43 Tex. 167; Dowlen v. State, 14
Tex. App. 61; Patterson v. Nutter, 78
Maine, 509 ; for collection of English
authorities see note to Fitzgerald v.
.?orthcote, 4 Fos. & Fin. 663 ; Cooley
on Torts, 170, 172, 288; Cooley's
Const. Lim. (5th ed.) 417, 341. The
tendency of modern authority is to
restrict rather than enlarge the power
of the teacherin this respect, the brutal and savage methods of punishment,
formerly tolerated, are fast disappearing under the refining influences of
modern civilization.
See Cooley's
Blackstone, page 453, top, note 15.
The books commonly assume that
the teacher has the same right to

chastise the pupil as the parent has
the child: 1 Bish. on Crim. L. (2d
ed.), 886; 1 Hawk. P. C. (6th ed.) c.
60, j 23. "According to the old Roman law, the father was privileged,
under certain circumstances, to kill or
abandon his new-born child." 2
Whart. Crim. L., 1563, p. 403 ; 2
Kent. 203 ; 1 B1. Com. 453; Schoulder's Dom. Rel.(3d ed.), 244, p. 336.
Many authorities advocate the doctrine that the teacherstands in locoparentis: Danenloffer v. State, 69 Ind.
29.5, M09; s. c. 35 Am. Rep. 216;
Com.v. Seed, 5 Penna. L. J. Rep. 78 ;
State v. Pendcrgras,2 Dev. & Bat.
365 ; s.c. 31 Am. Dec. 416 ; Fitzgerald v. Forthcote, 4 Fos. & Fin. 656;
State v. Burton, 45 Wis. 150; s. c.
S0 Am. Rep. 706; s. c. 18 Am. L.
Reg. (N. S.) 233, note, 233; Reeves
Dom. Rel. 288 ; lheritagev. Dodge, S.
Ct. N. II., March 11, 1887. Bishop
says that the authority of the teacher
"will seldom quite equal the parental
right :" 1 Bish. Crim. Law (7th ed.),
886.
Reeves, Domestic Relations, likens
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a teacher to a public officer. This is most effective means of enforcing the
disapproved in Lander v. Seaver, 32 rules of school and advancing the puVt. 122. " In no proper sensecan hebe pil, provided the punishment be readeemed a public officer, exercising by sonable; and ordinarily, malice or
virtue of his office, discretionary and wickedness are necessaryto render the
quasi judicial powers." Blackstone teacher liable criminally: onnm onsays that "the master is in wealth v. Seed, 5 Pa.L. J. Rep.78, 80.
loco parentis and has such a por"In the school, as in the family,
tion of the powers of the parent com- there exists upon the part of the pumitted to his charge as may be neces- pil the obligation of obedience to
sary to answer the purposes for which he lawful commands, subordination, civil
is employed. This power must be tem- deportment, respects for the iights of
perately exercised and no schoolmas- other pupils and fidelity to duty.
ter should feel himself at liberty to These obligations are inherent in any
administer chastisement coextensive
proper school system, and constitute,
with the parent" This language is so to speak, the common law of the
approved in Lander v. Scarer. In
school. Every pupil is presumed to
England, in the time of Edward IV, know this law, and is subject to it,
the relation of the teacher appeared whether it has or has not been re-ento be that of a temporary guardian:
acted by the districtboard in the form
Yearbook, 7 Edward IV; and it was at of written rules and regulations:"
one time questioned whether a school- State v. Burton, 45 Wis. 150; Apmaster might chastise his pupil:
proved in Danenhoffer v. State,69 I nd.
Yearbook, 2 Edward IV. Hawkins 295, 299. "The legal objects and
places the parent and child, master purposes of punishment in schools are
and servant, and schoolmaster and pu- like the object and purp.ase of the
pil, upon the same footing: Hawk. P1. State in punishing its citizen. They
Cro. 150, and this seems to be borne are three-fold: first, the reformation
out by many early cases: Asbery v. and highest good of the pupil; secJames., Vent. 70; Newman v. Bennett ond, thee:nforcement and maintenance
2 Ch. Rep. 195; Penn v. Ward, 2 C. of correctdiscipline in the school ; and
M. R. 338; Lamb v. Burnett, 1 Cro. third, as an example to like evil& J. 291.
doers:" Approved instruction, in
Whether the relationof the teacher
State v. Mizner, 50 Ia. 145, 149.
to his pupil is identical with that of
The character and interest of the
the parent to his child, itappearsclear teacher, combined with the refinement
that it is analogous to that relation, which education gives to the human
being less confidential perhaps.
mind in softening the heart, like paIt is the duty of the teacher to rental love, isgenerally found a suffimaintain good discipline in the gov- cient protection for the children. But
ernment of his pupils, to quicken the if these fail, the law affords ample prointerest of the slothful, to arouse the tection against cruelty and oppression,
indolent from their lethargy, to curb while it is a shield to those who have
the impetuous and to subdue and con- done their duty: Corn. v. Seed, 5 Pa.
trol the stubborn. That this duty may L. J. Rep. 78, 82.
be fulfilled, th taskmaster should be
In Beg. v. Hopley, 2 Fos. & Fin.
clothed with authority to inflict cor- 206, COCKBR. , C. J., stated the Engporal punishment when, in hi judg- lish view, in his charge to the jury,
ment, it is necessary and the best and as follows: "By the law of Eng-
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land, a parent or schoolmaster (who
for this purpose represents the parent
and has the parental authority delegated to him), may for the purpose of
correcting what is evil in the child,
inflict moderate and reasonable corporal punishment, always, however,
with this condition: that it is moderate and reasonable. If it be administered for the gratification of passion
or of rage, or if it be immo lerate
and excessive in its nature or degree,
or if it be protracted beyond the
child's powter of endurance, or
with an instrument unfitted for the
purpose and calculated to produce
danger to life or limb; in all such
cases, the punishment is excessive,
the violence is unlawful, and if evil
consequences to life or limb ensue,
then the person inflicting it isanswerable to the law, and if death ensues
it will be at least manslaughter."
The teacher is not bound to heed
the instructions not to whip his child.
A father may not so far interfere with
the workings of the school : State v.
Von Stranz (Tenn.), 3 Leg. Rep. 19.
A father may delegate his authority
over his child to the schoolmaster: 2
Kent Com. 169, 170; Stevens v. Fasset4 27 Me. 266, 230; S t v. Pendergrass, 2 Dev. & Bat. (N. C.) 365; but
it seems that a scho,flmaster cannot
delegate his authority to punish:
Reeves Dom. Rel. (3d ed.) 375.
While a father may delegate his aithority, he cannot authorize excessive chastisement; not having possessed that right himself, lie cannot
delegate it: Reg. v. Hpley, 2 Fos.
& Fin. 202.
Where a pupil continues to attend
school after having attained the age
of 21 years, lie thereby forfeits any
rights lie might have by reason of his
majority, and may be punished for
violation of theschool rules the same
as though he were a minor: Stevens
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v. Fassett, 27 Me. 266; State v. Mizner,
45 Ia.248; s. c. 21 Am. Rep. 769.
Where excessive violence is shown,
as where it produces death, the teacher's motive is immaterial: Reg. v.
Hoplcy, 2 Fos. & Fin 202; Whart.on
Horn. (2d ed.), 165. The question
of excessive punishment is not affected by the motive or intent of the
master: Lander v. Seavr, 32 Vt.
114, 124. When the correction administered, is not in itself immoderate and therefore beyond the authority of the teacher, i:s legality or illegality must depend entirely upon
the quo anino with which it is adminiqtered. Within the sphere of
his authority, the master is the judge
when correction is required and of
the degree of correctiou necessary,
and like all others intrusted with a
discretion, lie cannot be made penally
responsible for error of judgment,
but only for wickedness of purpose:
State v. Pendergrass, 2 Dev. & Bat.
(N. C.) 335, 366; Corn. v. Seed, 5 Pa.
L. J. Rep. 78, 80.
The punishment must be inflicted
for some specitic offense. "In no case
can the punishment be justified, unless it is inflicted for some definite offense or offenses which the pupil has
committt d and the pupil is given to
understand what lie or she are being
punished for. Punishment inflicted
when the reason of it is unknown to
the punished, is subversive and not
promotive of the true objects of punishment and cannot be justifiede:
State v. Mizner, 50 Ia. 145, 149. If
the pupil does not know why the
punishment is inflicted, it is unreasonable to look for reformation therefrom. Just the contrary result might
be expec:ed. This rule does not require the teacher to state to the pupil
in clear and distinct terms the offense
CNewhich she or lie is punished. It
only requires that the pupil, as a
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reasonable being, should understand
from what' occurred, for what the
punishment is inflicted. Where a
pupil has been habitually refractory
and disobedient, the teacher in punishing him for a particular offense,
may take into consideration his habitial disobedience, and it is not necessary that he should inform the
pupil at the time, that he is being
punished for his past as well as his
Sheehan v.
present misconduct:
Sturges, 53 Conn. 481, 484.
In the nature of the case, it is very
difficult to determine with exact precision when a teacher has exceeded
the bounds of moderation. That correction which will be considered by
some as unreasonable, will be viewed
by others as perfectly reasonable.
What may be considered by some a
venial folly, to which none, or very
little, correction ought to be applied,
by others will be considered as an
offense that requires very severe
treatment. In deciding questions of
discipline, the teacher acts judicially,
and is not to be made liable, either
civilly or criminally, unless he has
acted with express malice or been
guilty of such excessive punishment
that malice may be fairly implied.
All presumptions favor the correctness and justice of the action: Cooley's Const. Lim. (5th ed.) 417, 341;
Cooley on Torts, 171, 172, 280; Anderson v. State, 3 Iead (Tenn.) 455,
457; Dowlen v. State, 14 Texas App.
61, 65. A teacher "is a judge ot
limited authority, not an autocrat :"
Cooley on Torts, 288. As a teacher
acts in a judicial capacity when he
corrects, he is therefore not liable for
errors of opinion: Reeves, Dom.
Rel. (3d ed.) 420. But a teacher in
inflictingcorporal punishment, should
exercise reasonable judgment anddiscretion and be governed as to he
mode and severity of the punishment

by a consideration of the nature of
the offense, the age, size, etc., of the
offender: Com. v. .Randall, 4 Gray,
36; .Lander v. Searer, 32 Vt. 114; Anderson v. State, 3 Head (Tenn.) 455;
Uooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290.
Where the teacher acts without the
exercise of reasonable judgment and
discretion, he is guilty of an assault
and battery, but when he acts in good
faith, he is not liable for an error of
judgment as to when, and to what extent punishment is necessary. "Ile
is not required to be infallible in his
lie is the judge to dejudgment.
ternine, and to what extent,correction is necessary; and like all others
clothed with a discretion, he cannot
be made personally responsible for an
error in judgment, when he has acted
in good faith and without malice :"
Heritagev. Dodge, S. Ct. N. H., March
11, 1887.
The law has not undertaken to prescribe stated punishment for particular
oflbinses,but has contented itself with
thegeneral grantofpowerof moderate
correction, and has confided the gradation of punishment within the limits
of thisgrant,to the discretion of the
teacher. The line which separates
moderate correction from immoderate
punishment, can only be ascertained
by reference to general principles.
All the decisions upon the subject,
sanction the use of corporal punishment. While corporal punishment is
thus countenanced, the tendency of
public sentiment and time general tone
of the decisionstend towards its final
abolishment, and it is evident that this
mode of punishment will eventually
disappear from the schools, as it has
already disappeared from the list (if
punishment of crimes. See Hutton v.
State, Ct. App. Texas, May 25, 1887;
1 Bish. Crim. L. (7th ed.), 886.
Punishment with a rod which
leaves marks or welts on the person ot
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the pupil for two months afterwards,
or much less time, is immoderate and
excessive: State v. .Jfizner, 50 Iowa, 145.
But the fact of leaving temporary
marks alone, has been held not to be
sufficient: State v. Pendergrass,2Dev. &
Bat. (N. C.) 365, 367 ; the injury must
have been permanent: Set~e v. Alford,
68 N. 0. 322. Perhaps this case goes
too far in favor of the teacher. In
Reg. v. Hopleg, 2 Fos. & Fin. 202, the
schoolmaster received the father's assent to beat the child, a boy thirteen
or fourteen years old, to subdue his
alleged obstinacy. He beit the boy
two and one-half hours, secretly, in
the night, with a thick stick, which
resulted in the boy's death. He was
held liable to the charge of manslaughter: Wharton on Hom. (2d
ed.), 165. It is said that the question of excessive punishment is one
of fact for thejury : Sheehan v. Stlurges,
53 Conn. 481; and that the teacher
should have the benefit of the doubt:
Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 124.
Whether a raw hide is a proper instrument of punishment is a question
for the jury. Evidence to show that
it was used in other schools in the
vicinity is admissible to rebut the
charge of malice: Id. The teacher
is not justifiable in inflicting such
corporal punishment as "all hands
The
would pronounce excessive.
proper test is the reasonable judgment
of reasonable men:" Patterson v. Nutter, 78 Me. 509; s. c. 57. Am. Rep.
818.
As the teacher has power to make
reasonable rules and regulations for
the proper government of the school,
lie may punish the pupils for violating them:
Sheehan v. Sturges, 53
Conn. 481. He may also punish for
disobedience to lawful and reasonable
command: Daynenhoffer v. State, 69
Ind. 295; s.c. 33 Am. Rep. 216. But
the teacher cannot punish the pupil
VOL. XXXVI.-57

for not doing something the parent
has requested the pupil to be excused
from doing. The remedy in such
case is not corporal punishment, but
expulsion: State v. illizner, 40 Iowa,
115, 152 ; Mlforrow v. Wood, 35 Wis.
59. It seems that the authority of
the teacher in this respect is limited
to cases of misconduct; hence punishment cannot be inflicted, unless
where education is by law compulsory, to compel pursuance.:of any particular line of study: Rulison v. Post,
79 Ill. 567; J3orrow v. Wood, 35 Wis.
59 ; S. c. 13 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 692.
A pupil may be punished for violating
the rules against swearing and quarreling: Deskin.s v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485;
s. c. 55 Am. Rep. 337; or against
fighting: Hutton v. State, supra; or
for refusing to render an excuse of
absence from school without leave:
Danenhoffer v. Slate, 69 Ind. 295; or
for disturbing the school by making
a noise resembling a cough, an act
of contempt and defiance of the
Heritage v.
teacher's authority:
Dodge, supra; or for refusing to solve
examples in arithmetic at home:
Balding v. State, Ct. App. Texas,
March 9, 1837.
The causes for which punishment
may be inflicted, are very clearly and
succinctly stated by the Supreme
C mrt of Vermont in Lander v. Searer,
32 Vt. 114, 121: " Acts done to deface or injure the school-room, to destroy the bookIs of scholars or the
books or apparatus for instruction, or
the instruments of punishment; language used to other scholars to stir
up disorder and insubordination, orto
heap odium and disgrace upon the
master; writings and pictures placed
so as to suggest evil and corrupt
language, images, and thoughts to the
youths who must frequent the schol;
all such and similar acts tend directly
to impair the usefulness of the schoot,
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the welfare of the scholars, and the
authority of the master. By common
consent and by the uniirersal custom
in our New England schools, the
master has always been deemed to
have the right to punish such offenses.
Such power is essential to the preservation of order, decency, decorum, and
good government in school."
A rule against truancy is a reasonable rule:
King v. Jefferson City,
71 Mo. 628; 36 Am. Rep. 499; Burdick v. Babcock, 31 Iowa, 562, 567.
The supervision and control of the
master over the scholar extends from
the time he leaves home to attend
school till he returns home from
school, especially where the offense
has a direct and immediate tendency
to injure the school and bring the master's authority into contempt: Lan-

der v. &aver, 32 Vt. 114. In Balding v. State, supra, it is held that the
teacher may require preparation of
lessons at home by the pupil. The
authority and control of the teacher
over the pupil, outside of the schoolroom, is tersely stated by the Supreme
Court of Missouri, as follows: "If the
effect of acts done out of the schoolroom, while the pupils are returning
to their homes, and before parental'
control is resumed, reach within the
school-room, and are detrimental to
good order and the best interests of
the school, no good reason is perceived why such acts may not be forbidden and punishment inflicted on
those who commit them :" Deskinsv.
Gose, 85 Mo. 485; s.c.55 Am. Rep. 387.
B. E.BLA.c.
St. Louis, Mo.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
WESTCOTT v. MIDDLETON.
The burden of showing that an undertaker's establishment, in which he
keeps coffins, ice-boxes, and cases in which he preserves the bodies of the dead,
and in the rear of which he cleanses and dries such boxes, is a nuisance, is on
the complainant.
Such an establishment in a populous place is not a nuisance.
That a single person of a most sensitive taste on the subject is seriously disturbed thereby, and no others are called who have been annoyed, a case is not
made requiring the interference of the court.
Physical discomfort arising from a morbid taste or an excited imagination,
as distinguished from such discomfort arising through the organs of sense
common to all, is not enough to justify the court in closing such an establishment.

(Syllabus by the Court.)
BILL for permanent injunction.
J.T. Crandall,for complainant.
. A. Armstrong, for defendant.
BIRD, V. C.-The parties to this controversy own adjoining
lois in the city of Camden. The complainant occupies his as a
dwelling-house and for offices. The defendant occupies the
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basement and first floor of his dwelling to carry on the business
of an undertaker, using the front room as an office, the second
room as a place to keep supplies, and the second and third
stories with his family. On the lot of the defendant, back of
the first and second rooms, is a kitchen or extension, between
which and the lot of the defendant is an open space going back
to the rear of the lot, which is 180 feet deep. In this open
space is a hydrant. The cellar' of the defendant is used for
storing lumber, which, as occasion requires, he takes out in the
rear, through this open space, to a shop which is at the extreme
rear end or his lot, th,".e to be used in making boxes. The complaint is that the defendant is guilty of maintaining a nuisance
in the maintenance of this business of undertaking, and that the
complainant is entitled to the aid of this court in being relieved
therefrom. There is a charge that the defendant disturbs the
complainant in the manufacture of boxes. This point is practically abandoned. But the complainant insists, in the first
place, that this business is carried on in an unlawful manner;
and, in the second place, that the defendant has no right to carry
on this business where lie does. The proof shows that the defendant buries from 100 to 150 persons a year, and the vehicles
which he uses for that purpose are driving to and from his
place of residence about four times in every case; so that from
five to six hundred times during the year the complainant has
the opportunity, if heattends thereto, to be reminded that death
has taken place, that some one is a corpse, and that preparations
are being made for the funeral; or that some one has just been
buried. In every such case the defendant uses a large box in
which the corpse is preserved, as far as possible, from decomposition, by use of ice in another box, made of tin, which is
placed directly over the corpse. Formerly the tin box opened
underneath, by a tube running down through the box containing
the body, to carry off the water as the ice melted. This is now
dispensed with, so that there is no connection whatsoever
between the ice and the corpse. .These boxes which are so used
to preserve the body are taken, after the burial, to the residence
of the defendant, through his office and store to the rear thereof;
and in this narrow space, by the side of the hydrant, are often
washed, and, if not washed there, are washed further back in
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the yard. They have been allowed to remain there for an houri
and sometimes longer; occasionally all night. The complainant insists that he has several times noticed offensive odors from
those boxes, which have greatly distressed him, and given him
alarm. Indeed, it may be said that there is no doubt but that
the complainant has been frequently exercised in his mind on
account of the presence of these boxes, which have been receptacles of the dead; nor is there any doubt but that he has observed offensive odors, but whether from these boxes or not is
not so clear to my mind. There were odors arising from that
locality, but the defendant insists that they came from a drain
which he found to be choked up on two occasions, and that after
the drain had been opened and cleansed there were no longer
any odors. The complainant insists that these odors were of
the character that he says they were, because flies were attracted
there in great numbers, among which was what is known as the
blow-fly, which is supposed, according to the testimony, more
likely to be attracted to places where there is animal decomposition than the ordinary fly.
The defendant admits the use of his premises for the purposes
alleged in the bill. He also admits placing the boxes referred
to immediately in the rear of the main part of his house, and
by the hydrant in question, and of cleansing them there; but he
insists that they were never allowed to remain there any longer
than was necessary before they were thoroughly cleansed and
dried, and, when cleansed and so dried, were immediately taken
away and put under cover. - He says, also, that he never takes
to this place of business any box which has been used in case
the corpse was of a person who had died of any contagious disease without first thoroughly cleansing the box. The defendant
has also shown that on two occasions the drain referred to was so
stopped up as to produce offensive odors, which were not perceived when the drain was open. So that, after the fullest consideration, my mind is led to the conviction that the odors complained of may have arisen from some other source than that
alleged by the complainant. In other words, I am not satisfied
that the defendant has conducted his business in such an unlawful manner as to cause any undue annoyance or discomfort to
the complainant.
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But the further contention, that the business itself is a nuisance, is of great importance, and cannot be passed by without
the fullest consideration. The claim is that it is impossible to
carry on a business of this character without constant liability
to communicate diseases to those who reside in the neighborhood,
and that this liability creates dread, discomfort, and apprehension, which abridges the rights of property. It is insisted that
the deadly spore will, in spite of the utmost precaution, be carried about in such vessels, and are liable to be dislodged and to
be communicated to the nearest inhabitant at any moment, impregnating them with the seeds of death.
In the first place, admitting the possibility of danger lurking
in every box where the person buried therefrom has died of a
contagious disease, what is the duty of the court? Should the
court say that such business, however lawful, cannot be carried
on in a populous part of the city ? I am not prepared to aqsent
to that doctrine. It is quite clear, to my mind, that this, like
many other occupations, may be so conducted as to be a nuisance. For example, a grocer might allow his vegetables to decay in such quantities, and in such localities, upon his premises,
as to do infinite harm to his neighbors, and subject him to the
penalties of the law, or to the restraint of a court of equity.
The same may be said of the vendor of meats; so negligent
might lie be as to scatter disease and death to multitudes. But
because these things are possible, or may occasionally happen, it
is not pretended for a moment that it is unlawful to carry on the
grocery business, or to vend meats, in populous parts of our
cities. It seems to me that the same reasoning may be applied,
with great certainty, to the business of undertaking. It may be
carried on so negligently, with such indifferent regard to the
rights and feelings of others, as to be not only an offense to the
tender sensibilities of the intelligent and refined, but to be a
direct menace to the health and open violation of the civil
rights of all residing in the neighborhood. Now, as, in the cases
supposed, there is a remedy whidh does not go to the destruction
of the occupation, but which at the same time protects the rights
of others in the comfortable enjoyment of their property, so in
the ease in hand, it seems to me most clear that the court has it
within its power to prevent the misapplication of a legal right,
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and that to go further would be a destruction of that legal right.
The law means to protect every one in the enjoyment of such
rights,--in the enjoyment of his health, as well as in the enjoyment of his property, on the one hand : and, on the other, in
the enjoyment of his legitimate vocations, as well as in the possession of his property.
The defendant has a right to the possession of his property; and to carry on a legitimate business
there in a lawful manner is an equally sacred right. Is the
business in which the defendant is engaged a lawful one? To a
certain extent that is not disputed. Has lie a right to carry it
on on the premises which he owns and occupies? He certainly
has, unless it unreasonably interferes with the lawful rights of
another. The counsel for the complainant, perceiving the force
of this view, and what would be likely to result therefrom under
the evidence, insisted, at last, that carrying on the business of an
undertaker by the defendant was in itself so obnoxious to the
complainant as to render his house uncomfortable, and that that
fact alone was sufficient to justify this court in restraining the
defendant from the use of his premises in carrying on said business. But it has not been shown that disease of any kind has
ever been communicated by any act or omission of the defendant. It is not in evidence that the fatal spore has ever been
allowed to remain in any of the boxes which the defendant and
his employees have handled as children do their toys; nor does
it anywhere appear that any special risk has been presented in
the management of this business. Therefore, as to the first
question, I must conclude that the complainant cannot prevail.
In the second place, it is urged that the business of an undertaker is a nuisance per se. Is this proposition maintainable?
Must the undertaker retire from the inhabited parts of our villages, towns, and cities? Is an occupation which is absolutely
essential to the welfare of society to be condemned by the courts,
to be classified with nuisances, and to be expelled from localities
where all other innocent and innoxioi1s trades may be carried on?
In other words, is this business so detestable in itself as unreasonably to interfere with the civil rights or property rights of
those who dwell within ordinary limits, and who can and do,
without effort, see and hear what is being done? The inquiry
is not whether it is obnoxious to this or that indivi 1ual or not;

WESTCOTT v. MIDDLETON.

but whether or not it is of such a character as to be obnoxious
to mankind generally, similarly situated. There are certain obscene or offensive sights, certain poisonous or destructive gases
or odors, certain disturbing sounds or noises, which affect most
persons alike; can the business of an undertaker be classed with
any of these? Is the business of an undertaker of this class?
Before the court can condemn a trade or calling, it must appear
that it cannot be carried on without working injury or hurt to
another; and, as I have said, that injury or hurt must be such
as would affect all reasonable persons alike similarly situated.
The law does not contemplate rules for the protection of every
individual wish or desire or taste. It is not within thejudicial
scheme to make things pleasant or agreeable for all the citizens
of the State.
But to proceed with the case before me. Let us ascertain
from what standpoint, or under what circumstances, the complainant regards this employment a nuisance per se. Mr. Westcott is one of the most highly respected citizens. He is about
72 years old. As to the subject-matter in hand, and everything akin to it, he is most sensitive or tender. It is conceded
that he has an extraordinary horror or repugnance to contemplating anything pertaining to death or to the dead. Such
emotions or feelings so control him that he has not attended a
half-dozen funerals during his long life. As he advances in
years, this sentiment becomes more and more intolerable. It is
urged, and with great reason, that, these facts being so, Mr.
Westeott's judgment is not only overcome by his imagination,
but that innumerable evils are created thereby for his soul to
feed upon, which he charges in this case to the defendant.
Plainly, the circumstances are special, and most unsafe to found
any general rule of law upon. Giving the complainant credit
for all that he can possibly be entitled to, and keeping in mind
what he actually suffers, whether justly or unjustly, whether it
be the result of imagination or an oversensitive nature or not,
and also keeping in mind the rights of the defendant, how far
can the court go, with safety, in protecting Mr. Westcott in his
home, and securing to him every comfort that a citizen is entitled
to in the enjoyment of that home? Many observations which
have been made in disposing of the first branch of the discus-
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sion are equally applicable here; they will not be repeated.
The court, in disposing of every such question, cannot but at
once look beyond the judgment to be given in the particular
case; the court cannot but inquire, what next, or where will such
judgment lead to? The inquiry inevitably arises, if a decision
is rendered in Mr. Westcott's favor because he is so morally or
mentally constituted that the particular business complained of
is an offense or a nuisance to him, or destructive to his comfort,
or his enjoyment of his home, how many other cases will arise
and claim the benefit of the same principle, however different
the fhcts may be, or whatever may be the mental condition of
the party complaining. One may complain of the smell of
vegetables, another of fresh meats, another of the ordinary
sound of the anvil, another of the running of a saw,
or the humming of machinery, and the like, without limit;
every case being as meritorious as the one now under consideration. Hence the value of general principles can never
be lost sight of. A wide range has indeed been given to courts
of equity, in dealing with these matters, but I can find no case
where the court has extended aid, unless the act complained of
was, as I have above said, of a nature to affect all reasonable
persons, similarly situated alike.
My attention has been called to the case of railroad Co. v.
Angd, 41 N. J. Eq. 316. The principle there laid down is of
great value in every such case. The defendant was engaged in
a lawful business, but so used its tracks in making up its trains
and distributing the ears in front of the complainants' dwelling
that, by reason of stenches, noises, smoke, steam, and dirt
thereby occasioned, the comfort of the complainants' home was
seriously impaired. The court below allowed an injunction
against such use of the road; but the court did not pretend to
hold that the company must abandon the use of its tracks
altogether. It was only decided that the company had no right
to allow its engines or its cars to remain in the presence of or
near by the house of the complainants, making hideous noises,
emitting smoke and steam, and unwholesome odors, to the great
discomfort of the complainants in their home. The judgment
of the court simply looked to the proper exercise of the lawful
rights of the defendant, and, in the lawful exercise of those

WESTCOTT v. MIDDLETON.

rights, what inconvenience or annoyance the complainants might
suffer they must submit to. Engines in passing might whistle
or emit smoke, steam, and dirt, cattle might bellow, sheep bleat,
and hogs squeal, but to that extent the complainants must yield
to the general demand. To this extent the court was sustained
on appeal. I can find nothing in that case to lead me to say
that the business of an undertaker is a nuisance per se.
Mly attention has also been directed to Cleveland v. Gas Light
o., 20 N. J. Eq. 201, in support of conplainant's views. In
that case, the court held: "Any business, however lawful,
which causes annoyances that materially interfere with the
ordinary comfort, physically, of human existence, is a nuisance
that should be restrained. * * * To live comfortably is
the chief and most reasonable object of men in acquiring property as the means of attaining it; and any interference with our
neighbor in the comfortable enjoyment of life is a wrong which
the law will redress. The only question is, what amounts to
that discomfort from which the law will protect?" The learned
chancellor then made this important observation: "The discomforts must be physical; not such as depend on taste or
imagination.
But whatever is offensive, physically, to the
senses, and by such offensiveness makes life uncomfirtable, is a
nuisance; and it is not the less so because therr may be persons
whose habits and occupations have brought them to endure the
same annoyances without discomfort." For a strikingly similar
definition, see Walter v. Selfe, 4 Eng. Law & Eq. 15.
In this case, then, we have the broad, yet perfectly perceptible or tangible, ground or principle announced, that the injury
must be physical, as distinguished from purely imaginative. It
must be something that produces real discomfort or annoyance
through the medium of the senses; not from delicacy of taste
or a refined fancy. This is very comprehensive; indeed, I
cannot conceive of a more liberal or broad statement of the law;
yet I apprehend it is a true delineation of the law. How,
therefore, shall I apply this rule ? - I must find that physical discomfort has been produced, or will be; but, in so doing, I must
not forget the influence of the imagination or a morbid or abnormal taste on the mind and body. What has been disclosed
by the proof? These facts: Mr. Westcott and the defendant
VOL. XXXVL-58
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have lived side by side, in these same houses, for about eleven
years. During all this time the latter has carried on this business of burying the dead, in about the same open and unpretentious manner that he now does. There is no evidence that
Mr. Westcott or any other person has even been afflicted by
reason of the defendant's occupation; indeed, nothing has been
attempted in that direction. Yet it is admitted that this trade
has been and is carried on by the defendant in the midst of the
most populous part of the city of Camden. And what, to my
mind, is of very great consequence, in considering whether this
trade affects the body of Mr. W¥estcott through what is known
as the bodily senses, or through his imagination or taste, is the
fact that not another person has been produced who has been
affected as he has been. As just stated, great numbers, from
day to day, look out upon this establishment just as Mr. Westcott does, although at a greater distance; but, if the injury
results from seeing these evidences of the havoc of disease and
of death, then, surely, distance cannot mitigate it, and, while so
many others have been subject to the same influences, not one
has been offered to say that he has suffered any annoyance or
discomfort by the presence of this employment in the neighborhood; and, although the business of undertaking, caring for,
and burying thi dead, has been conducted in about this same
manner from the earliest times (that is, in an open and public
manner, in the town and city, as well as in the country), and so
continues to be, where the most refined and cultivated abide, as
well as where the unpretentious do, yet from no class has any
one been brought to testify to any bodily or mental injury or
suffering because an undertaker was carrying on his vocation in
his neighborhood.
Hence, in my judgment, before a trade or business can be declared to be a nuisance per se, it must be made to appear that
it necessarily works injury, discomfort, or annoyance to the property or persons of citizens generally who may be so circumstanced as to come within its influence. It is not enough that
only one person, and that one the complainant, alleges discomfort; and certainly his case is greatly weakened when he admits
that so sensitive is he on the subject that in 72 years he has not
attended a half-dozen funerals. If the court can compel this
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defendant to cease his trade next door to Mr. Westcott, because
the sight of these instruments used in burying the dead have an
unhealthy influence on his mind, then the vendor of crape, and
the artist who cuts tombstones and monuments, will inevitably
be liable to the same condemnation. See Demarest v. Hardhan,
34 N. J. Eq. 469, 474.
Perhaps I ought to remark that the case of Barnes v. Hathorn,
54 le. 124, so much relied on by counsel of the complainant,
rested on a very different state of facts, in this; that there was
not only a tomb on the land of the defendant within 44 feet of
the dining-room of the plaintiff, but that at the time oftheaction
the defendant had a dead body in it, and it was shown that once
before it had six deposited therein, and that experts swore that
effluvia injurious to health escaped therefrom. Nor is the case
of Clark v. Lawrence, 6 Jones, Eq. 83, in any sense like the
one before me.
The results of my inquiries are that while the defendant has
no right to conduct his business so as to endanger or threaten
the health of the complainant, or to make his home uncomfortable, either by filling the air with noxious vapors, or the germs
or seeds of disease, the evidence does not show that he has done
either, and that the business of an undertaker is not a nuisance
per se. The bill should be dismissed, with costs.
As the injunction in restraint of
nuisances, under their manifold forms,
is, principally, a means whereby men
can rid themselves of unpleasant
sights and sounds and other sensual
impressions, it seems that the history
of this branch of jurisprudence must
throw much light on the relative degrees of progress in civilization, between the time when the injunction
was first invoked to restrain nuisances,
and the present day. While the
limits of a note are obviously too
narrow to permit anything approaching a satisfactory examination of this
subject from the point of view just
indicated, yet it seems possible, even
within such limits, to gather together,
at least, a few data in illustration.

And first it must be noticed that,
however much the men of any one
epoch differ from each other in certain respects, yet that there are always along with these differences
certain phenomena in which they all
agree. Whence it follows that those
mento whose lot it falls to administer
the law, whether their authority come
from the king or from the people,
must, in certain respects, be in accord
with their fellows.
Without voyaging far on the sea of
psychology, it may be said that the
differences between men at any one
time consist generally in slight individual peculiarities, while the resemblances between them consist,
generally, in opinions and tastes and
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habits having their origin deep down
in their being. When, therefore, the
courts, at any given time, deliver
themselves of their judgments upon
the various subjects that come before
them for their decision, they utter, not
only their own individual opinions,
but, in addition, the general sentiment
of the community as it exists at such
time; in other words, the degree of
civilization then and there subsisting.
In the case under review, the court
takes the ground that " the injury
must be physical, as distinguished from
purely imaginative. It must be something that produces real discomfort
through the medium of the senses;
not from delicacy of taste or a refined
fancy." (The above italics occur in
the opinion.) While it is, no doubt,
pardonable in ordinary oral discourse,
to distinguish the imaginative from the
physical by giving to the former term
the meaning of ,unreal, and to the
latter, the meaning of real, yet, in
such a solemn opinion as the judgment of a court, it does not seem unreasonable to look for a more careful
use of language.
That the court uses the two adjectives in their colloquial signification, is evident from the second of
the two clauses quoted above, for the
court distinguishes between discomfort produced "through the medium
of the senses" and that produced by
"delicacy of taste or a refined fancy."
Is the distinction well taken? Unless the great majority of philosophers
are completely at fault, it is certain
that the dictum: ".Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu"
is valid; and, if this be so, any distinction between discomfort produced
through the medium of the senses,
and discomfort produced by delicacy
of taste is, perhaps, not quite palpable; for it, certainly, is part of the
alphabet of psychology that the im-

agination not only never does, but
that it never can act without some
mediate or immediate sensible excitement. Hence, to permit certain
actions on the ground that they produce effects only imaginative, and to
forbid certain other actions because
they produce physical effects, seems
rather like being moved thereto by
something quite as unreal as the
court apparently considers the imagination.
In the case of Cleveland v. Gas Light
Co., cited in the principal case, it will
be observed that the same distinction
is taken between things physical and
things imaginative,and in that case,
as well as that of R. R. Co. v. Angel,
the alleged nuisances affected the nose
and the ears. As it can scarcely be
suggested that any one of the senses
is more than a channel through which
information is given to the intellect
of man concerning material existences
outside of himself, it follows that it
matters very little, if at all, through
which of the senses such information
may come.
To apply the foregoing remarks to
the present case will require a rather
minute examination of its facts and
of the opinion of the court.
It may be assumed at the outset
that the odors complained of by the
plaintiff did not arise from the boxes
used by the defendant, and this confines the investigation to the spectacle
that was presented in the defendant's
back yard. As to the danger resulting from the cleansing of the boxes
in which corpses had been preserved,
it may be said that there is sufficient
uncertainty to render a positive opinion one way or the other almost impossible; and, according to the wellknown principle, the defendantshould
not be disturbed in his business on
that account.
There remain but two questions to
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be considered: first, whether the
alleged injury was physical; and,
second, whether the business of an
undertaker, or, rather, the exhibition
of his paraphernalia, is tolerable in
the midst of a populous town.
As to the first question, the mere
proposing of it seems to furnish its
answer. The court, after stating that
the complainant is " one of the most
highly respected citizens," adds that
"lie is about 72 years old," and that
upon the subject of death he is
"most sensitive and tender."
To assert that a man is of any given
age may be, of course, very 'proper;
for the verification of the fact is, generally, quite simple. But after the
fact is established, what does it amount
to? Does the law say that a man of
advanced age has less right to claim
its protection than one that haA youth
on his side? If not, then whether
the complainant were 72 or 22 makez
no shadow of a difference, unless his
age had so impaired his faculties as
to make him incompetent to form
correct conclusions; and this is not
even suggested. Again, unless impressions received through the eyes
are to be considered "imaginative"
as distinguished from "physical," the
injury charged here would seem to
answer to any known definition for
the latter term, for what the plaintiff
distinctly objects to is something quite
objective to himself, and of whose existence he is made aware only through
the medium of his eyes. Surely
nothing more need be said in answer
to the suggestion that the injury complained of in this case is not "physical?'
The court, furthermore, urges as an
obstacle in the way of granting an
injunction, that the complainant is
hyper-sensitive on the subjectof death,
and as an evidence of his morbid condition the court notices "that be has

not attended a half-dozen funerals
during his long life."
Undoubtedly, courts cannot gratify
the abnormal desires of morbid persons, but is an indisposition to attend
funerals an irresistible evidence of
morbidity? Do healthy men ordinarily show an alacrity for such
diversion ?
Even admitting that the two questions just proposed may be answered
in the affirmative, these answers have
no bearing on the present case, for
the complainant is not seeking an
injunction' to restrain any persons
from compelling him to attend funerals; but what lie seeks is that a
certain spectacle may be removed
from his sight, which probably few
persons not connected with the business of funeral directors can regard
with entire complaisance.
The court furthersays that no other
persons have objected to the defendant carr%ing on the operaions under
discussion, except the complainant.
Two very plain considerations arise
in answer to this proposition; first,
that the parties to this controversy
occupy contiguous properties, and,
second, that whether or not any given
person objects to any alleged nuisance,
is largely dependent upon that person's refinenuent and energy.
His next d..or neighbor has a
rather better view of what goes on in
one's back yard than a person residing
at a greater distance; and, what would
aflbrd delight to some, would shock a
man of refinement. It may be said
that there is no such question here.
But it is true that many a man endures much before lie ventures on a
lawsuit.
This seems a fitting point at which
to examine the remarks of the court
on the broad question, whether "the
business of an undertaker is a nuisanceper se."
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At the very threshold of the inquiry,
the court proposes a query that suggests an answer to the above question,
as though the question were distinctly
simple, and susceptible of an unequivocal affirmation or negation. But,
assuming for the moment, that the
exhibition of the various implements
used by undertakers in the prosecution
of their trade is of such a character
as to cause positive annoyance to the
person under whose observation it
falls, it by no means follows that the
business cannot be carried on in a
populous community; for it might
either be done under cover, or, if that
were impossible, the undertaker might
have his office where he pleased, and
have the various functions of his
trade performedat some distance from
dwellings.
The court further remarks: "The
inquiry is not whether it (the business) is obnoxious to this or that individual or not, but whether or not it
is of such a character as to be obnoxious to mankind, similarly situated.
There are certain obscene or offensive
sights, certain poisonous or destructive gases or odors, certain disturbing
sounds or noises, which affect most
persons alike; .can the business of an
undertaker be classed with any of
these?"
. As to the first proposition, that any
given series of acts must be obnoxious
to men in general, and not to certain
abnormal specimens of the race, in
order that a court may declare it a
nuisance, there can be no dissent; but
it scarcely seems entirely pertinent to
inquire, as the court does inquire
further on, "how many other cases
will arise and claim the benefit of the
same principle, however different the
facts may be, or whatever may be the
mental condition of the party complaining ?"
If the principle be just, what matter

it whether there be few or many persons claiming its protection?
If the facts be different, it does not
seem very clear how the principle
can be invoked; and, if the mental
condition of the party claiming it be
abnormal, one would think that that
fact, in itself, would furnish a sufficient answer to the claim.
But to return to the question, which
may be re-stated as follows: Is it a
nuisance for an undertaker, carrying
on his business in the residence section of a city, to exhibit in his back
yard, directly in view of his next
door neighbor, the process of manufacturing boxes for the reception of
dead bodies, to wash such boxes
after they have been so used, and, in
a word, to show forth the means
whereby an undertaker pursues his
calling?
Looking at the question in the
abstract, it will be assumed as a
general principle that, as men become
more civilized, the sight of death, or
what suggests death, is distinctly
painful; while to the savage, the
sight of death is a powerful stimulus
to his bloodthirsty passions.
Hence it would seem to follow that,
if the law be the reflection of the
state of civilization, at any given
time, it must condemn to-day what,
perhaps, it tolerated, or even encouraged, yesterday.
Therefore, if the general sentiment
of a community is opposed to any
given trade under given circumstances, the law should declare such
trade under such circumstances not
permissible.
While, undoubtedly, many, if not
most, sub-divisions of jurisprudence
may be brought under the principle
stare dedsis, yet such branches of the
law must obviously deal very largely
with cases whose circumstances and
whose facts have varied from each
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of Ladied DecoratireArt Club, S. C. of
other but little from the first; but it
is submitted that nuisance cannot be
Pa., April 23,188S. and it seems to be
considered as a branch of this sort, a fair inference from this, that, if a
for if the view here presented be thing be the source of discomfort to any
just, what might have been eminently man by reason of its exciting within
him feelings that he has a right not
proper fifty years ago, may be emto anticipate under the circumstances,
inently improper to-day, and this for
such thing is distinctly a nuisance.
the reason that, with the develop.
ment of man, as a being endowed
Although, as has been already sugwith an intellect and a will, his in- gested, the principle stare decisis
tellect discerns more clearly the cannot exert a controlling influence
in cases such as the one under disreally desirable way, and his will
desires it more ardently than he did cussion, yet, as indicia of the drift of
judicial-and, therefore, public-senin the past.
Therefore, to argue that, because timent upon the question of private
any given act was tolerated in the nuisance, it seems fitting that the
past it should still be permitted, is to present note should conclude with a
argue to very little purpose, save
reference to one or two decisions on
only where such act falls distinctly
the subject.
under some principle of morals,
The court, in the present ease,
which, from their very nature, must
refers to Walter v. Sele, 4 Eng. Law
be eternal.
and Eq. 15, as supporting its distincBut the question, is this or that tion, between things physical and
act a nuisance, in the vast majority things imaginative. The essential
of cases, amounts to nothing as a facts of that case were that the plainproblem in morals, but is simply re- tiff, Walter, was the owner of a parduced to another question,-is this or
cel of land, laid out as a garden or
that act agreeable to the average
pleasure-ground, and upon which
sentiment, not only of the community
was situated his dwelling. The dein general in which it occurs, but, fendant, Selfe, erected a brick manustill more, of the members of that
factory on land adjoining plaintifi's,
from which manufactory emanated
community under whose notice it
certain odors and vapors of which
takes place.
If any other criterion be adopted the plaintiff complained. Upon the
in cases (if this sort, no one can have question whether the odors and
redress for the most revolting sights vapors in question were noxious to
or sounds, unless either they are op- human health, KNIGHT BRUCE, V. C.,
posed to good morals, or they are uses the following language: 'I do
brought under the notice of more not say, nor do I deem it necessary to
than one or two persons.
intimate any opinion, for it is with a
It has frequently been announced
private, and not a public, nuisance
by the courts, that a thing may be
that the defendant is charged. * * *
Ought this inconvenience to be cona nuisance in one place that would
not be so in another: Ball v. Bay, L. sidered, in fact, more than fanciful,
R., 8 Ch. App. 471; Brode v. Saillard, or as one of mere delicacy or fastidiL. R., 1 Ch. D. 692; St. .Ielen's ousness?" and the answer is in the
Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 H. L. Ca. affirmative. Here is no such distinction as the court in the present ease
C50; Bhodesv. Dunbar,7 P. F. Sm. 287;
proposes between things ph9sical and
Bishop v. Banks,33 Conn. 118; Appeal
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things imaginative. The Vice Chancellor dismisses, as a matter of no consequence in the case before him, the
question of health, because of the
incontestable right of every man to
be protected in the comfortable enjoyment of his home.
Mr. Addison, in his work on Torts
(6th ed., p. 366), says of the exercise
of d trade lawful in itself: "The spot
may be very convenient for the defendant or for the public at large, but
very inconvenient to a particular individual, who chances to occupy the
adjoining land; and proof of the benefit to the public from the exercise of
a trade in a particular locality can be
no ground for depriving any individual of his right to compensation in
respect to the particular injury he has
sustained from it."
Mr. Wood, in his work on Nuisauces, p. 575, speaking of what constitutes a nuisance in any particular
case, says: "It is a matter of small
consequence at law, whether it has
ever been held a nuisance before or
not; if it amounts to an actual invasion of another's right, it is actionable,
even if it has never previously been
the subject-matter of an action. At
law, every case stands or falls upon its
own merits, and if the special facts
establish the nuisance, it will be so
held, although never so held before.'
In the case of Snyder et al. v. Cabell et al., decided November 13,
1886, by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, the bill was
filed by plaintiffs to enjoin the defendants from carrying on a skating
rink within a short distance of plaintiffs' dwelling-house.
One of the
grounds upon which the bill rested,
was the noise emanating from the
rink, and the court, in granting the
injunction, remarks: "We base the
propriety of the injunction on the
noise alone."

Among the cases cited by the West
Virginia court, in support of its opinion, is that of Catlin v. V-alentive, 9
Paige, 575, it which it was decided
that it is not necessary that the business complained of should endanger
health, but that "it is sufficient if it
produce that which is offensive to the
senses, and which renders life and
property uncomfortable." Another
case relied on by the court is that of
Crump v. Lambert, L. R., 3 Eq. 409,
which, according to the court, decided:
"that smoke, unaccompanied with
noise or with noxious odors, noise
alone, and offensive odors alone, although not injurious to health, may
severally constitute a nuisance. The
material question in all cases is
whether the annoyance produced is
such as materially to inteifere with
the ordinary comfort of human existence!'
The case of Bogers v. Elliott, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, March 2, 1888, was an action of
tort to recover damages for the ringing of a church bell in Provincetown,
Massachusetts. The facts of the case
were, briefly, these: the plaintiff,
Rogers, wlise house faced the church
of which the defendant, Elliott, was
pastor, was ill from a stroke of the
sun, and during this illness the plaintiff was thrown into convulsions
whenever the bell was rung. The
defendant having been requested to
stop the bell ringing and having refused to accede to the request, the
plaintiff on his recovery brought this
action.
In the court below the judge directed the jury to find a verdict for
the defendant, which direction was
sustained by the Supreme Judicial
Court on the broad ground that nothing can be a nuisance that affects
only persons in an abnormal condition
of mind or body. The court, how-
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ever, KNOWLoN, J., delivering the
opinion, uses the following language
that seems to apply very directly to
the case under review, viz.: the question of nuisance or no nuisance depends upon "tAHe effect of noise upon
people generally, and not upon those,
on the one hand, who are peculiarly
susceptible to it, or those, on the
other, who, by long experience, have
learned to endure it without inconvenience; not upon those whose strong
nerves and robust health enable them
to endure the greatest disturbances

without suffering, nor upon those
whose mental or physical condition
makes them painfully sensitive to
everything about them." The court
likewise quotes from a portion of the
opinion of the Vice-Chancellorin the
case under review, assuming that in
this case the plaintiff was in an abnormal condition.
Of course, mutatis mutandis, noise
and unpleasant sights stand on the
same plane.
WILLIAm REHN CLAxTON.
Philadelphia.

Supreme Court of Missouri.
NOE ET AL. v. KERN ET AL.
Where a wife bequeathed all her property to her husband, "in the full
faith that 'he' will properly provide for the two children of my deceased
brother * * * whom we have undertaken to raise and educate:" Hdd,
that a trust was created in favor of the children, and that in consideration of
their frail health and helpless condition, an award of $9,000 for their education and maintenance was not excessive.
APPEAL

from St. Louis Circuit Court;

DANIEL

DILLON,

Judge.
This is a suit in equity, instituted by Paul and Sadie Noe,
through their curator, John Wickham, against Robert H. Kern,
administrator de bonis non of the estate of Virginia C. Ferguson, deceased, and Horace Ghiselin, administrator of the estate
oflVilliam F. Ferguson, deceased, to charge the property in
the hands of the administrator of the estate of Virginia C. Ferguson with a trust which plaintiffs claimed was created in their
favor by virtue of the last will and testament of the said Virginia C. Ferguson. There was a verdict for plaintiffs, and defendants appealed.
Given Campbell and H. D. Laughlin, for appellants.
Collins & Tamison and John Wickham, for respondents.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
NORTOzi, C. J.-This is a proceeding in equity which calls
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for the construction of the will of Virginia C. Ferguson, wife
of William F. Ferguson. She died on the 6th of September,
1883, leaving the following will: "In the name of God, amen.
I, Virginia C. Ferguson, wife of William Ferguson, of St.
Louis, Mo., make and declare this to be my last will and testament, and hereby revoke all other wills by me heretofore made.
First. I give, devise, and bequeath unto my husband, William
Ferguson, all of my real and personal estate absolutely; the
real estate being mostly situated in the city of Norfolk, county
of Norfolk, State of Virginia. I make this bequest in the full
faith that my husband will properly provide for the two children of my deceased brother. Simeon, whom we have undertaken to raise and educate. I appoint my said husband, William Ferguson, the executor of this, my last will and testament." Two days after the death of Mrs. Ferguson, her busband died, leaving a will, theretofore made, devising all his
property to his wife, the said Virginia, without making any
provision for the two children of said Virginia's brother Simeon,
whom they had undertaken to raise and educate, and who are
the plaintiffs in this suit, and claim that, from the precatory
words used in her will, a trust was created in their favor.
During the two days that said William lived after his wife's
death, the evidence showed that he was under the influence of
morphine, and not capable of transacting business. The said
Virginia, at the time of her death, owned in St. Louis'personal
property worth about $10,000 and also owned considerable real
estate in Virginia. Some time before the death of Mrs. Ferguson, she and her husband, who were childless, took into their
family Paul and Sadie Noe (the plaintiffs in this suit), two
children of Simeon Noe, the deceased brother of Mrs. Ferguson,
who lived with them as their adopted children, and were supported and maintained by them as such, until the death of said
Virginia and William Ferguson. No debts were proved up
against the estate of said Virginia. The Circuit Court held that,
by the will of Mrs. Ferguson, her estate passed to her husband,
charged with a trust in favor of said Paul and Sadie Noe, and
that the sum of $9,000 was a reasonable amount for the purpose Mrs. Ferguson had in view, which was adjudged to be paid
over to the curator of the plaintiffs, both of whom were minors.
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The defendants have appealed from this judgment, and insist
thatthe will of Mrs. Ferguson does not admit of the construetion thus put upon it, and that, if it does, the judgment of the
court is for too large an amount.
In support of the first ground relied upon, it is insisted that
the tendency of recent decisions is to restrict, rather than enlarge, the doctrine applicable to precatory trusts, and we have
been cited to a number of authorities stating that proposition
generally. While this may be so, it may nevertheless be safely
affirmed that they do not overthrow the rule prevailing both in
England and this country" that words of recommendation, request, entreaty, wish, or expectation, addressed to a legatee or
devisee, will make him a trustee for the person or persons in
whose favor such expressions are used, provided the testator has
pointed out with sufficient clearness and certainty both the subject-matter of,and the objects of, the intended trust :" 1 Jarm.
Wills, *385. The rule upon this subject is stated in the case of
Schrnueker'8 Estate v. Beet, 61 Mo. 596, to be as follows:
"Courts of equity have frequently discussed the question as to
the force of words or expressions of recommendation in wills in
regard to the use to which testators might desire the persons to
whom they had given legacies might putthem. The prevailing
doctrine is that no particular form of expression is requisite in
order to create a valid and binding trust; and that words of
recommendation, request, entreaty, wish, or expectation will impose a binding duty upon the devisee by way of trust, provided
the testator has pointed out with sufficient clearness and certainty both the subject-matter and the object of the trust."
In this class of cases, the difficulty is not as to what the rule
is, but as to its application; and as is said in 1 Perry, Trusts,
§ 114: "Every ease must depend upon the construction of the
particular will under consideration. The point really to be
determined in all these cases is whether, looking at the whole
context of the will, the testator intended to impose an obligation
on his legatee to carry his wishes into effect, or whether, having
expressed his wishes, he intended to leave it to the legatee to
act on them or not at his discretion." I do not understand the
fact to be disputed that two of the conditions presented by the
above rule as being necessary to the creation of a trust, viz.,

NOE ET AL. v. KERN ET AL.

the subject-matter of the trust, and the objects of the trusts,
are set forth in the will with sufficient clearness and certainty;
but it is claimed that the precatory words used are not sufficient
to raise a trust, and that the devise of the property to the husband absolutely is inconsistent with the notion or contention
that by the second clause of the will it was intended to charge
the property thus devised with a trust. That a trust may be
attached to property devised to another absolutely, provided the
intention of the testator to so charge it appears in the will, we
think is settled by the following cases: In Knight v. Knight, 3
Beav. 148, it is laid down as a general rule that when property
is given absolutely to any person, and the same person is by the
giver, who has power to command, recommended, entreated, or
wished to dispose of that property in favor of another, the
recommendation, entreaty, or wish shall be held to create a trust,
if, upon the whole, the words are so used that they ought to be
construed as imperative, if the subject of the recommendation be
certain, if the objects or persons to have the benefit of the
recommendation or wish be also certain. Bohon v. Barrett's
Ex'r, 79 Ky. 378; Hill, Trustees, 71.
It is shown by the evidence in this case that Mir. and Mrs.
Ferguson had no children ; that the two infant plaintiff. were
the children of Mrs. Ferguson's deceased brother; that both of
them were frail, in bad health, without any means of support;
that one of them was so afflicted that in all probability she
would never be able to contribute to her own support, on account of her mental and physical deformities; that these children were taken into their family, and treated as their children,
though they were never legally adopted; that they were the
objects of great solicitude, both on the part of Mrs. Ferguson
and her husband, from 1872 till the time of her death; that her
husband died in two days after she did, having been during that
time in a state of stupor, and unable to transact business. Was
it the intention of Mrs. Ferguson that these children should be
provided for by her husband out of the property devised by her
to him ? and is that intention sufficiently shown by the use of
the words, "I make this bequest in the full faith that my husband will properly provide for the two children of my deceased
brother, Simeon, whom we have undertaken to raise ?"
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It is well settled that, in construing a will, the intention of
the testator is to be ascertained, if possible, and that, in looking
for the intention, the surrounding circumstances may be taken
into consideration. Hall v. Stephens, 65 Mo. 677; Wig. Wills,
103. In view of the circumstances surrounding Mrs. Ferguson,
and the language of the will, we think it cannot be doubted that
she intended that her husband should provide for the children
out of the property devised to him. In the case of Varner v.
Bates, 98 Mass. 274, the wife made a will devising to her husband for his life the use and income of her estate, "in the full
confidence that he will, as he has heretpfore done, continue to
give and afford my children such protection, comfort, and support as they or either of them stand in need of." It was held,
Chief Justice BIGELOW rendering the opinion, that the words
employed subjected the use and income to a trust which a court
of equity would enforce, and, in speaking of the rule that the
intent of the testator must govern in such cases, observed :
"It may be sometimes difficult to gather that intent, and there
is always a tendency to construe words as obligatory in furtherance of a result which accords with a plain, moral duty on the
part of a devisee or legatee, and with what it may be supposed
the testator would do if he could control his actions." In the
case of Knox v. Knox, 59 Wis. 172, the language of the will
was: "Having full confidence in my said wife, and request at
her death she will divide equally," etc.; and it was held to be
sufficient to create a trust. Erickson v. Willard, 1 N. H. 217;
1 Jarm. Wills, 385.
Considering the frail and helpless condition of these children,
the manner in which they have been raised, the circle in society
in which they moved, we are unwilling to say that the sum decreed to be paid to their curator was more than it ought to be.
Judgment affirmed, in which all concur.
It is not necessary that technical

wordsbe used in wills, to create trusts:
1 Jarm. Vills, 385.
If the desire of the testator can be
inferred with reasonable certainty
from his language, it will be treated
by the court as his command, and will
be executed accordingly: Cary v.

Cary, 2 Sch. & Lef. Rep. 189; Smith
v. Bell, 6 Pet. 75-84; Barrett v.
Marsh, 126 Mass. 213; Bose v. Porter,
141 Id. 309. It is in all cases a question of intention: Spooner v. Lorejoy, 108 Mass. 529; Warner v. Bates,
98 Id. 274. The wishes and desires
of a person as to the disposition of his
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property after his death, constitute
his will: Burt et al. v. Herron, 66
Penna. St. 402. It is difficult to reconcile the decisions; this arises from
the great variety of facts and circumstances which are scarcely ever the
same in any two cases: Ridgdy v.
Bond and Wife, 18 Md.433; Brograre
v. Winder, 2 Yes. Jr. 633. Courts
have held that trusts were created,
where property was devised to certain
persons, to be disposed of by them,
"among such of our brothers and sisters and their children as shall be
most in need of same," the court, observing that the devise was not void
for uncertainty, as it could be ascertained, who stood in the greatest
need: Bull v. Bull,8 Conn.47. Again,
where property was left to a person,
"with a special request," that the
donee divide the same at her decease,
"between her near relatives and
mine," it being decided that the term
"near relatives" would mean such
persons as would take under the
Statute of Distribution: Handley v.
Wrightson, 60 Md. 198. And where
it was requested that a certain sum
"may be paid" to the son of the
deviser: Reed's Administratorv. Reed,
30 Ind. 313. Where £100 were to
be paid, "if it shall be her grace's
pleasure so to do ' Harlandv. Triggs,
1 Bro. C. C. 491. Where a husband
"desires" his wife to devise certain
property left her by him, to persons
named by him: Pushman v. Filiter, 3
Yes. Jr. 7. Where the testatrix "entreated" a son-in-law to make a certain disposition of property bequeathed to him by her: Prevost v.
Clarke, 2 Madd. 458. Where a devise
was made of a certain sum to the testator's daughter, coupled with the
condition, "and so order and direct
that $8,000 of said sum be paid over
to her son 'A,' when he shall arrive
at the age of twenty-one years?'

Matter of accounting of Denton, 102
.N.Y. 200. And where a legcy-is left
to "B." with the request that he leave
it upon his death to C, D., & E.: Eddy
& Htartshorne, 7 Stew. (N. J.), 419.
Where the following expressions
and words have been used, a trust
has been upheld: I desire him to
give; Vernon v. Vernon, Amb. 4:
I hereby request; IYewlan v. .clligan, 1 B. C. C. 4S9: Advise him to
settle; Parker v. Balton, 5 L. J. N. S.
Ch. 98: This is my last wish; .Hinxman v. Paynder, 5 Sim. 546: Require and entreat; Taylor v. George,
2 V. & B. 378: Well knowing;
Briggs v. Penny, 3 Dely. & S. 539:
Under the conviction; Barnes v.
Grant, 26 L. J. Ch. 92: To apply the
same; Salisbury v. Denton, 3 K. & J.
529: Most heartily beseech; Meredith
v. Heneage, 1 Sim. 553; Not doubting:
Parsons v. Baker, 18 Yes. Jr. 476:
Absolutely trusting; Irr-ne v. Sullivan, 8 L. R. Eq. 673: Of course, he
will give; Robinson v. Smith, 6 Madd.
194: Under the firm conviction;
Barnes v. Grant, 26 L. J. N. S. C. 92 :
Having confidence; Beid's Admin. v.
Blackstone, 14 Gratt. 363: Authorize
and empower; Brown v. Higgs, 4
Yes. Jr. 708 s.c. 5 Id. 495 ; Elwin
v. Elwin; 8 Id. 561: Order and
direct; Cary v. Cary, 2 Sch. & L.
189: Desire; Harding v. Glyn, 1 Atk.
469: Belief; Cary v. Cary, 2 Sel. &
L. 189: Will; Eales v. England,
Prec. Chan. 200; s. c. 2 Vern. 466:
]Request; Bade v. Eade 5 Mad. 118:
Hope; Paul v. Compton, 7 Yes. Jr.
375: Recommend; Tibbitts v. Tibbitts, 19 Yes. Jr. 656; .Haroodv.
West, 1 Si. & Stu. 387; .31alein v.
Keighley, 2 Yes. Jr. 333: Confide;
Griffith v. Eran, 5 Beav. 24: Slepherd v. Natloge, 2 J. & I. 766: Entreat; Prev-ost v. Clarke, 2 Madd. 458;
Meredith v..Heneage, 1 Sim. 548. See,
also, in this connection, Perry on
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Trusts, 111; Lewin on Trusts, 118;
Harrisonv. Harrison,Admz, 2 Grat.
l and note, 44 Am. Dec. 372-9.
No commendatory terms in a will
expressing a" wish,"" will," "desire,'
etc, are sufficient to create a trust,
unless there be certainty as to the
parties who are to take and what they
are to take: Lines v. Darden and Wife,
5 Fla. 72; Gilleert v. C(hapin, 19 Conn.
342; Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 10
Vesey Ch. R. 521.
The English courts, for nearly two
hundred years, have construed precatory provisions in wills in the most
liberal manner. See Edes v. England,
Prec. Chan. 200; r. c. 2 Vern. 466;
Harding v. Glyn, I Atk. 469; Pierson v. Garnet, 2 Bro. C. C. 38, 226;
Paul v. Qbmptor, 8 Ves. Jr. 375; Cary
v. CGry, 2 Sch. & Lef. 173-89; Forbes
v. Ball, 3 Mer. 437 ; Wright v. Atkins,
1 Turn & RIs. 143; Wood v. 6,, 1
Keen, 317; Williams v. Williams, 1
Sim. N. S. 358; Briggs v. Penny, 3
Mac. & G. 546; Bernard v. .Minshall, II. It. V. Johnson, 276; Bonser
v. Kinnear, 2 Gif. 195; Godfrey v.
Godfrey, 11 IV. R1. 554; Shoveon v.
Shovdton, 32 Beav. 143; Irvine.v. Sulliran, L. R. 8 Eq. 673; Crwick v.
Tucker, 17 Eq. 320; Lemarchant v.
Lemarchant, 18 Id. 414.
But during the last few years the
law of that country has undergone
some changes: Wig. on Wills, 213.
A more strict and uniform. requirement of definiteness in regard both
to the subject-matter and objects of
the intended trusts than was formerly the case, is now required:
Lambe v. Eamis, 6 L. R. Ch. 597;
Hutchinson & Tenant, In re, 8 Ch. D.
540; Heneage v. Andorer, 10 Price,
230-65; Wright v. Atkyns, 1 T. & B.
313-15; Sale v. ilfoore, 1 Sim. 534;
Green v. Jlfarsden, 1 Drew. 546;
Wood v. Oglander,12 L. T. N. S. 626;
William v. Williams, 1 Sim. N. S.

358; M1orrin v. Morrin, 19 L. R., Ir.
37 V. C.; Carnick v. Tcker, 17 L. R.
Eq. 320; Wison v. Bell, 4 Ch. 581;
3rackett v. llfacket4 14 Eq. 49; Stead v.
M.dlor, 5 Ch. D. 225. Compare Briggs
v. Penny, 3 Mac. & G. 546; Mc(eCormick v. Grogan, 4 L. R. II. L. 82;
Norris v. Frazier, 15 Eq. 318. See,
also, in this connection, In re Adams
and the Knrington Vestry, 27 Ch. D.
394; MussoorieBank v. Raynor, 7 App.
Cas. 321.
In the early American cases, the
English latitude of construction was
allowed, and any expression of recommendation by the testator, that "A."
should give an interest to "B.," was
regarded by the courts as a trust in
favor of "B.:" Wig. on Wills, 214;
Erickson v. Willard, I N. IL 219;
Bull v. Bull, 8 Conn. 47; Harrisonv.
Harrison'sAdn'r, 2 Gratt. 1; Sines v.
Darden,5Fla.51; Ingram v. Fraley,29
Ga. 553; Negroes v. Plummer, 17 Md.
165; Warner v. Bates, 98 Mass. 274;
Beed's Adm'r v. Reed, 30 Ind. 323.
But the courts are now disposed
to .place a much more conservative
construction upon such expressions
of desire. One of the text-book
writers observes that "such words
are used because the testator desires to leave the matters to which
they relate to the discretion of the
donee. * * * That if the intention was to control that discretion,
very different language would ordinarily be adopted, and furthermore, that
in nine cases out of ten, where the
courts have raised a trust out of such
mere words of wish or exhortation, it
has been donecontrary to the expectations of the testator, and more out of
.regard to the moral than the legal
duty of the donee:" 2 Redfield on
Wills, 423.
The tendency of modern decisions
is to have regard to the intention of
the testator, as gathered from the
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whole will, in determining whether
or not such expressions shall create a
trust: Corby v. Corby, 85 Mo. 371.
Various courts have held in the
following recent cases, that no trusts
were created, where a certain sum
was bequeathed to several persons in
the following words, "relying upon
them to dispose of the same for the
benefit of such charitable, and benevolent, and educational purposes, as they
shall judge will most promote the
comfort and improve the condition of
the poor; or in case any of my descendants should become poor and
needy, then to apply in whole or in
part to such descendants :" Willetts v.
Willets, 33 Hun, 401. Where a testator gave all his property to his two
younger sons with this explanation:
"inmakingthisdispositionof myproperty, I assume that my eldest son will
understand and appreciate my reasons
for giving whatever property I may
have at my decease to his younger
brothers, and that they, on their part,
will not fail to do for him and his
family all that, under the circumstances, the truest fraternal regard
may require them to do :" Rose v.
Porter, 141 Mass. 309. Where a testatoruses language which goes to show
his intention to devise a fee to his
wife, coupled with words of recommendation, suggestion, or advice, as
to the management or occupation
thereof: _oxsey v. Hosey, 10 Stew.
(N. J.) 21; Spears v. Ligon, 59 Tex.
233. Where the wife is requested to
finally dispose of property left her,
"among my children and grandchildren, as shall seem to her good:"
Foose v. Wltnore et a., 82 N. Y.
405; larke v. Leuppe, 14 Weekly
Dig. 206; Vier v. .Awchgan otove
Co.,
44 Mich. 506. Where a clause in a
will reads, "I commit my granddaughter, Annie, to the charge and
guardianship of my daughter, Sara L.

Cooke, in whose honesty, good-will,
and integrity I repose the utmost confidence," and continuing, "I enjoin
upon her to make such provisions for
said grandchild, and of my residuary
estate, now in her hands, in such
manner, at such times, and in such
amount, as she may judge to be expedient and conducive to the welfare
of said grandchild, and her own sense
of justice and Christian duty shall
dictate :" Lawrence v. Cooke, 104 N. Y.
632; reversing S&me v. Same, 32 Hun,
127. Where a testatrix pr9vides, "It
is my desire and request, that S. shall
watch over and care for my friend W.,
and see that at no time, is she allowed
to suffer or want for the necessaries of
life :" JVide v. Smith, 2 Dem. (Surrogate) R. 93. Where a devise runs,
"to A. to be held, used, and enjoyed
by him, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns forever, with the
hope and trust that he will not diminish the same to a greater extent than
may be necessary for his comfortable
support and maintenance, and that at
his death, the same or so much thereof as lie shall not have disposed of by
devise or sale, shall descend" to three
persons named: Howard v. Crusie,
109U.S. 725. See, also, Eaton v. Wats,
4 Eq. 151; In re Bond, Cole v. Hawes,
4 Ch. D. 238; Parnall v. Parnall,9
Id. 96; Wynne v. Hawkins, 1 Brown
Ch. C. 179; Jubber v. Jubber, 9 Sim.
508; Prek v. Halsey, 2 P. Wms.R. 387.
Mlere precatory words will not convert a legatee or devise of an absolute gift into a trustee, unless it affirmatively appears that they were intended to be imperative: Bur v.
Herron, 66 Penna. St. 400.
The rule is well settled in Pennsylvania, at least, that words in a will
merely expressive of desire, recommendation, and confidence are not
sufficient to turn a devise or bequest
into a trust: Pennock's Appea 20
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Penna. St. 268; Jauretche v. Proctor,
48 Id. 466; Bradley v. Thunder, 105
Id. 173; Second Ref'd Prs't'n Church
v. Disbrow, 52 Id. 219
Furthermore, it is also well settled,
that property devised in fee simple is
not aflbcted by precatory words: The
Att'y Generalv. Hall,Fitzg.314; Bourn
v. Gibbs, 1 Rus. & M. 615; Holmes v.
Godson, 8 De Gex M. & G. 152; Jackson v. Bull, 10 Johns. 10; Ide v. Ide, 5
Mass. 500; Botcen v. Dean, 110 Id.
438; Van Duyne v. Van Duyne, 14 N.
J. Eq. 397; .Bonaet al. v. .lleieret al.,
47 Iowa, 607; Benkert v. Jacoby et al.,
36 Id. 273; Williams et al. v. Allison,
33 Id. 278; Napkins v. Glunt, 111
Penna. St. 287; Colon v. Colan, U. S.
C. Ct. Dist. Cal., Sept. 22, 1884; 21 Fed.
Rep. 594.
Neither will a trust be implied
where it clearly appears from the
will, that the testator intended to give
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the devisee full discretion in the use
of the property: Corby v. Corby, 85
Mo. 371 ; Gladding v. Fallett, 2 Dem.
(Surrogate) R. 58. This is now well
settled, although the opposite doctrine
was formerly held to be the law:
Erickson Y. Willard, 1 N. H. 217. See,
also, Ingiam v. Fraley, 29 Ga. 653;
Briggs v. Penny, 8 Eng. L. & E. R. 231.
Notwithstanding the general drift
of the later decisions in this country,
writers of respectability have not failed
to deplore the undue severity which
some courts have recently exhibited
in cases of this sort: Wig. on Wills,
216; Article, "Precatory Trusts," 4
And it would
Am. L. Rev. 617.
clearly seem, that there could be no
good ground for criticism in any case,
where the creation of a trust would
clearly subserve the testator's intent.
SOLON D. WiLso.z.
Chicago. Ill.

